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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article draws upon the authors' experiences in challenging
sodomy laws to evaluate the effectiveness of previous strategies to
overturn sodomy laws. This Article will suggest ways of improving
those strategies in the future and developing new avenues for these
challenges by incorporating domestic, international, and comparative
law.1
The Introduction to this Article will first discuss the legal impor-
tance of challenging sodomy laws, even though those laws are rarely
enforced. It will then discuss the importance of incorporating interna-
tional and comparative law in formulating these challenges. In Section
II, Professor Charlene Smith will discuss past and future strategies,
focusing on the topics of equal protection, morality, and the difference
(or lack thereof) between acts and status. In Section III, Professor Jim
Wilets will explore incorporating international and comparative law
into domestic challenges to U.S. sodomy laws.
It should be noted at the onset that sodomy statutes, although
not widely enforced, have much greater consequences for the civil
rights of gays and lesbians than "simply" criminalizing their sexual
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1. Professor Wilets notes, with considerable irony, that he initially relied upon his previous
article, as the basis for his amicus brief in the litigation challenging the Kansas Sodomy Statute.
See generally James Wilets, Using International Law to Vindicate the Civil Rights of Gays and Les-
bians in U.S. Courts, 27 COLUM. Hum. RTS. L. REv. 33 (1995). In part, this article is a result of
his recognition of the limitations of his previous article in constructing the arguments in actual
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relations.2 The existence of these sodomy laws has been invoked by
courts and legislatures to justify a wide range of human rights viola-
tions against gays and lesbians. These include violations of sexual
minorities' rights to equal protection, free association, free speech,
custody of their children, and a myriad of rights that heterogendered
people take for granted.3
The authors consider the incorporation of these seemingly dis-
parate domestic and international litigation strategies in one article as
essential. The use of domestic law is obviously a prerequisite to any
domestic litigation strategy, and certainly much has been written on
the substantive aspects of constitutional law as it affects sexual minori-
ties.4 The Supreme Court's decision in Romer v. Evans,5 in particular,
has generated an enormous amount of literature on this subject.6
2. See generally id. at 35. For example, claims by gays and lesbians based on equal protec-
tion have been rejected by courts based on the rationale that society has an interest in discourag-
ing criminal activity. Padula v. Webster, 833 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The principle case
discussed in this Article, a challenge to Topeka's municipal ordinance prohibiting solicitation to
engage in same-sex relations, resulted from the arrest of a man for simply discussing the possi-
bility of engaging in such activity. See City of Topeka v. Movsovitz, No. 77-332, slip op. (Kan.
Ct. App. 1998).
3. See generally Wilets, supra note 1.
4. See generally, e.g., Ruth Colker, Sexual Orientation: Militarism, Moralism, and Capital-
ism, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1201 (1997); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Multivocal Prejudices and Homo
Equity, 74 IND. L.J. 1085 (1999); Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 45 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1 (1994);
Anthony S. Winer, Hate Crimes, Homosexuals, and the Constitution, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 387 (1994); Evan Wolfson & Robert S. Mower, When Police Are in One Bedrooms,
Shouldn't the Courts Go in After Them?: An Update on the Fight Against 'Sodomy' Laws, 21
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 997 (1994).
5. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
6. See the following law review articles for various interpretations of Romer: James E. Bar-
nett, Updating Romer v. Evans: The Implication of the Supreme Court's Denial of Certiorari in
Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 645
(1999) (the Court's vagueness in Romer will allow for future court hearings concerning gay-rights
issues to read the case either broadly or narrowly); Peter M. Cicchino, Reason and the Rule of
Law: Should Bare Assertions of "Public Morality" Qualify as Legitimate Government Interests for
the Purpose of Equal Protection Review?, 87 GEO. L.J. 139 (1998) (statutes or policies that dis-
criminate against people on the basis of sexual orientation lack the minimum degree of reason-
ableness required by the Equal Protection Clause and denote a radical departure from the rule of
law); Matthew Coles, Issue: Intersexions: The Legal & Social Construction of Sexual Orientation:
The Meaning of Romer v. Evans, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1343 (1997) (true significance of Romer lies
in the message by the Court that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is the moral
("if not legal") equivalent of racial and sexual discrimination); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr.,
Nothing and Everything: Race, Romer, and (Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual) Rights, 6 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 229 (1997) (majority in Romer failed to recognize that the arguments concerning the
rights of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals paralleled those made about slavery that America had prior
to the Civil War and remain to have now); Robert D. Dodson, Homosexual Discrimination and
Gender: Was Romer v. Evans, Really a Victory for Gay Rights?, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. 271 (1999)
(although Romer v. Evans was significant in fighting for gay rights, litigants and courts should
seriously consider that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of gender dis-
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Nevertheless, some courts' tenaciousness in upholding legislation that
clearly meets the constitutional standards of animus-motivated legisla-
tion indicates that there is a discrepancy between constitutional theory
and the realities of litigation. Thus, there is need for a reassessment of
the ways in which civil-rights practitioners use constitutional theory
before recalcitrant and hostile courts.
The authors also firmly believe international and comparative
law are essential elements of any effective litigation strategy. First,
invoking United States obligations under international law is most
effective when United States domestic law, particularly state law, is
out of sync with those international legal obligations undertaken by
the federal government. This Article will demonstrate that there is
binding Supreme Court authority requiring all U.S. courts to respect,
whenever possible, the international obligations of the United States
federal government when interpreting federal and state law. This
requirement, implicates the very structure of our federal form of gov-
ernment. Separation of powers principles require that the judiciary
desist from interfering with the executive and legislative branches'
conduct of foreign policy. Similarly, principles of federalism require
that states refrain from preventing the federal government from speak-
ing with one voice in its conduct of foreign policy. Article VI of the
U.S. Constitution specifically provides that:
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwith-standing 7
crimination); Caren G. Dubnoff, Romer v. Evans: A Legal and Political Analysis, 15 LAW &
INEQ. 275 (1997) (in keeping the political system fair, the Court's decision in Romer was correct,
in that Amendment 2 consciously singled out homosexuals and denied them the equal protection
of the laws guaranteed by the Constitution.); Barbara J. Flagg, Animus and Moral Disapproval: A
Comment on Romer v. Evans, 82 MINN. L. REV. 833 (1998) (even under the rational basis test,
the pluralist values that establish the equal protection guarantee mandate a doctrine that moral
purposes in and of themselves never satisfy equal protection review); Joseph S. Jackson, Romer v.
Evans and the Politics of Equal Protection, 45 UCLA L. REV. 453 (1997) (in striking down
Amendment 2, the Court's decision was not a cold act of political will, but rather a judicial judg-
ment, appropriately embedded in the core principles of the Equal Protection Clause); Courtney
G. Joslin, Equal Protection and Anti-Gay Legislation: Dismantling, The Legacy of Bowers v.
Hardwick-Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996), 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 225.
(Romer's narrow holding lends skepticism to advocates of the immediate impact of Romer on
homosexual rights litigation); and Jane S. Schacter, Romer v. Evans and Democracy's Domain, 50
VAND. L. REV. 361 (1977) (in the final analysis, Romer can vigorously empower, but cannot
itself deliver, a meaningful democratic equality for gays and lesbians).
7. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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Although this seemingly clear constitutional dictate has been
somewhat weakened by the judicial doctrine of self-execution, 8 the
U.S. Supreme Court understood the constitutional importance of
international treaties in U.S. law when it held that domestic law
should be interpreted, whenever possible, in accordance with the
international obligations of the United States.
This Article will demonstrate that there is a clearly articulated
federal policy, by both the Executive Branch and United States Senate,
to respect and implement those international obligations that require
the United States to decriminalize same-sex consensual sexual rela-
tions. Indeed, that policy is enshrined in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights,9 to which the United States is a party.
Comparative law provides a normative reason why courts should
feel comfortable interpreting state law in accordance with our interna-
tional legal obligations. Currently, the United States is the only major
industrialized nation with sodomy laws.' ° Thus, comparative law is
useful for demonstrating to courts that this country is out of sync with
those developed nations to which our courts like to compare the Unit-
ed States. Comparative law therefore supports the proposition that
our international obligations are not simply a legal requirement; they
reflect the now universal consensus of industrialized democratic na-
tions that criminalization of same-sex relations is incompatible with a
democratic legal order respecting individual rights."
Professor Smith draws, in part, upon her extensive experience in
challenging Kansas' sodomy statute to suggest several effective strate-
gies for challenging sodomy laws under domestic law. Professor
Wilets draws upon his experience in using international and compara-
tive law in domestic litigation to suggest ways that international and
comparative law can be integrated into an effective domestic litigation
strategy.
8. See discussion infra Part III.A., wherein the author discusses the doctrine of "self execu-
tion" in greater depth.
9. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966).




II. DOMESTIC STRATEGIES FOR OVERTURNING SODOMY LAWS
A party arguing domestic law to oveturn sodomy law in the
courts of the United States has to confront four obstacles: (1) the suc-
cess of any direct challenge to a state's sodomy law on the basis of the
federal right to privacy is rendered improbable by the existence of
Bowers v. Hardwick;2 (2) in scrutinizing state legislation courts will
employ the lowest threshold of the three tier system of scrutiny; i.e.,
"rational basis" analysis; (3) courts will recognize morality as a legiti-
mate justification for sodomy laws; and (4) courts will often hold that
sodomy laws are aimed at acts rather than status, and thus do not
implicate equal protection. There are at least three strategies for
addressing these obstacles.
Before discussing these strategies, it should first be noted that
there is no need to necessarily undertake a frontal attack on Bowers v.
Hardwick. Bowers simply held that the federal right to privacy does
not preclude states from enacting sodomy laws.13 Bowers does not pre-
clude an attack on state sodomy laws on the basis of the federal Equal
Protection Clause or on the basis of state rights to privacy and equal
protection.
The strategies presented below permit parties to overcome sub-
stantive obstacles that they may encounter while litigating in state and
federal courts. This Article assumes that parties challenging sodomy
statutes have already chosen to rely only on the federal right to equal
protection and state rights to privacy and equal protection. It should
nevertheless be noted that many of the arguments contained in this
Article could be used in any attempt to directly challenge Bowers v.
Hardwick in federal court.
The first strategy is to demonstrate to the court that courts have
been willing, on occasion, to disregard the three-tier system when the
legislation in question has been motivated primarily by animus against
a particular group. It is especially helpful to use Justice Scalia's past
opinions to demonstrate that even the conservative wing of the
Supreme Court has abandoned, in substance, the rigid three-tier
approach under certain circumstances. 4 Since Scalia constitutes the
most vociferously antigay member of the Supreme Court, using his
own reasoning in past cases can be particularly effective. Indeed, a
consistent application of even the conservative approach to equal pro-
12. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
13. See generally id. at 186.
14. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
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tection analysis leads to the application of, at a minimum, a "rational
basis with bite" in reviewing the constitutionality of sodomy statutes."
The second strategy is to argue that morality alone cannot be
used as a justification to strike down or uphold a law. This strategy
questions the court's ability to apply objective criteria to determine
whether the morality upon which the legislation is based represents a
legitimate governmental purpose, or whether it simply represents the
illegitimate biases of society towards a particular disfavored group.16
Finally, the third strategy is to demonstrate to the court that Sca-
lia' is correct in observing that status and acts cannot be severed, 7 a
strategy that admittedly contains its own risks. The following discus-
sion presents these three strategies.
A. Abandoning the Three-Tier System When Prejudice Is Shown
With the exception of Kansas, recent court challenges have
resulted in declaring same-sex sodomy statutes unconstitutional. 8 In
15. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
16. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 630, 634-35 (1996) (antihomosexual bias does not consti-
tute a legitimate governmental purpose).
17. These suggestions do not mean that the authors are claiming these as the only argu-
ments that can be made using domestic law. For articles that inform an attorney as to how to
argue that same-sex sodomy statutes can be seen as sex discrimination, see Danielle Kie Hart,
Same-Sex Marriage Revisited: Taking a Critical Look at Baehr v. Lewin, 9 GEO. MASON U.
CIV. RTS. L.J. 1 (1998); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men
Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); James Wilets, Conceptualizing Private
Violence Against Sexual Minorities as Gendered Violence: An International and Comparative Law
Perspective, 60 ALB. L. REV. 989 (1997); Anne B. Brown, Note, The Evolving Definition of Mar-
riage, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 917 (1998); and Steven K. Homer, Note, Against Marriage, 29
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 505 (1994). For articles that inform an attorney as to how to argue
state constitutional protections, see Jack M. Battaglia, Religion, Sexual Orientation, and Self-
Realization: First Amendment Principles and Anti-Discrimination Laws, 76 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 189 (1999); Nancy J. Feather, Emerging Issue in State Constitutional Law Defenses of Mar-
riage Acts: An Analysis Under State Constitutional Law, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1017 (1997); Lisa M.
Farabee, Note, Marriage, Equal Protection, and New Judicial Federalism: A View from the States,
14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 237 (1996); and Elizabeth A. Leveno, Comment, New Hope for the
New Federalism: State Constitutional Challengers to Sodomy Statutes 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1029
(1994).
18. See Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998) (sodomy statute violated the right to pri-
vacy as guaranteed by the Georgia Constitution's due process clause); Commonwealth v. Was-
son, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) (sodomy statute violated the right to privacy and equal protec-
tion guarantees of the Kentucky Constitution); Williams v. State, (Baltimore City Ct., January
14, 1999); Gryczan v. Montana, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997) (private, same gender, consensual,
noncommercial sexual conduct is protected by state constitutional right to individual privacy; the
statute constituted governmental intrusion onto that right; public health goal attributed to statute
was not a compelling state interest to warrant that infringement on privacy rights; and the state's
interest in protecting morals was not a compelling state interest sufficient to warrant govern-
mental intrusion into fundamental privacy rights); People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y.
1980) (provision of Penal Law that criminalizes consensual sodomy or deviate sexual intercourse
between persons not married to each other violates federal constitutional rights); Commonwealth
[Vol. 24:49
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the Kansas challenge, the defendant was arrested by an undercover
police officer for violating a city ordinance that prohibited solicitation
to engage in same-gender sexual relations. In that case, the defendant
was arrested for agreeing to, but not participating in, an act of sod-
omy. 9 The underlying authority for the city ordinance2" is the Kansas
sodomy statute, which prohibits sodomy only between those of the
same sex.2 The case was heard at the municipal level, the district
court level, and finally at the appellate court level.23 The defendant
v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980) (voluntary deviated sexual intercourse statute exceeded valid
bounds of police power and infringed right to equal protection. (The state legislature later
repealed the law in 1995)); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. 1996) (adult's right
to engage in consensual and noncommercial sexual activities in privacy of adult's home is matter
of intimate personal concern at heart of state's protection of right to privacy).
Maryland had two laws criminalizing private adult sex. The "Unnatural and Perverted Sex-
ual Practice Act" made oral sex between people of the same gender a crime, while Maryland's
sodomy law prohibited anal sex. The oral sex statute was struck down in October of 1998 as a
result of an American Civil Liberties Union lawsuit. In order to end the lawsuit, the State agreed
that the sodomy law should be struck down as well. A final judgment prohibiting the State from
enforcing either law for private sex acts was entered in January of 1999. Accordingly, both laws
are now invalid and unenforceable.
19. City of Topeka v. Movsovitz, No. 77-332, slip op. 2-3 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998).
20. TOPEKA, KAN. CODE § 54-133(a) (1995 Supp.)
21. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505(a)(1) (1995).
(a) Criminal sodomy is:
(1) Sodomy between persons who are 16 or more years of age and members of
the same sex or between a person and an animal;
(2) sodomy with a child who is 14 or more years of age but less than 16 years of
age;
(3) causing a child 14 or more years of age but less than 16 years of age to engage
in sodomy with any person or animal.
(b) It shall be a defense to a prosecution of criminal sodomy as provided in subsection
(a)(2) that the child was married to the accused at the time of the offense.
(c) Criminal sodomy as provided in subsection (a)(1) is a class B nonperson misde-
meanor. Criminal sodomy as provided in subsection (a)(2) and (a)(3) is a severity
level 3, personal felony.
Id.
22. City of Topeka v. Movsovitz, No. 95-MC-21, slip op. (D. Kan. 1996). Judge James P.
Buchele issued the decision. He said, "The court appreciates that homosexuals have been his-
torically discriminated against generally and are victims of vile protests and hate crimes." Id. at
2. Regardless, he maintained the district court was not a place to change the law or make "novel
interpretations of constitutional provisions." Thus, he drew the conclusion that since the defen-
dant violated the law and the City had a "legitimate interest in prohibiting solicitation of illegal
sex acts in public places," the defendant was guilty. Id. at 6.
23. City of Topeka v. Movsovitz, No. 77-332 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998) (before Chief Justice
Brazil, Justice Green and District Court Judge K. Anderson). The court of appeals argument is
followed in the text of this article. Matthew Coles from the American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation, who represented the defendant ably, argued privacy, equal protection, and free
speech in the briefs submitted to the court. Additionally, there were excellent amicus briefs.
Karen Eager, for The Washburn Law School Gay & Lesbian Network, wrote one focusing on
Kansas constitutional law. Another was written by Charlene Muehlenhard for the Scientific
Study of Sexuality and signed by many well known psychologists, psychiatrists and social work-
ers. It gave an overview of the nature of sexual orientation. The third amicus was written by the
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lost in all cases. After the court of appeals case, the defendant filed a
petition for review to the Kansas Supreme Court. The Kansas
Supreme Court denied review. 4
In addition to Kansas, there are four states remaining with same-
sex sodomy statutes." For these five states, there is a new analysis
Inter-American Center for Human Rights. That brief raised issues regarding the state's legally
binding obligations under international law. Unfortunately, the Kansas court of appeals never
cited or referred to any of the amicus briefs.
24. Movsovitz, No. 77-332, slip op. (Kan. Ct. App.) reh'g denied, (Kan. July 9, 1998).
25. Arkansas, Oklahoma, Missouri, and Texas are the remaining states with sodomy laws
that target only same-sex acts. The corresponding statutes and applicable language are:
Arkansas:
(a) A person commits sodomy if such person performs any act of sexual gratification
involving:
(1) The penetration, however slight, of the anus or mouth of an animal or a per-
son by the penis of a person of the same sex or an animal; or
(2) The penetration, however slight, of the vagina or anus of an animal or a per-
son by any body member of a person of the same sex or an animal.
(b) Sodomy is a Class A misdemeanor.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Repl. 1997)
Oklahoma:
Any person who is guilty of the detestable and abominable crime against nature, com-
mitted with mankind or with a beast, shall be guilty of a felony. Any person con-
victed of a second violation of this section, where the victim of the second offense is a
person under sixteen (16) years of age, shall not be eligible for probation, suspended
or deferred sentence. Any person convicted of a third or subsequent violation of this
section, where the victim of the third or subsequent offense is a person under sixteen
(16) years of age, shall be punished by imprisonment in the State Penitentiary for a
term of life or life without parole.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tit.21, § 886 (West 1983). Oklahoma's sodomy statute does not strictly
identify homosexual sodomy, however, in Post v. State, Oklahoma's Court of Criminal Appeals
found the statute to be unconstitutional as applied to heterosexuals. 715 P.2d 1105, 1151 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1986).
Missouri:
1. A person commits the crime of sexual misconduct in the first degree if he has
deviate sexual intercourse with another person of the same sex or he purposely
subjects another person to sexual contact or engages in conduct which would con-
stitute sexual contact except that the touching occurs through the clothing without
that person's consent.
2. Sexual misconduct in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor unless the actor has
previously been convicted of an offense under this chapter or unless in the course
thereof the actor displays a deadly weapon in a threatening manner or the offense
is committed as a part of a ritual or ceremony, in which case it is a class D felony.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.090 (West 1983)
Texas:
1. A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with
another individual of the same sex. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (West
1994)
The Texas Court of Appeals held this statute was unconstitutional in State v. Morales, 826
S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992), however, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment.
State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1994). Currently two cases are challenging the "Homo-
sexual Conduct" law in Texas; Garner v. State, No. 14-99-00111CR (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)
and Lawrence v. State, No. 14-99-00109CR (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). In each case, the defen-
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resulting from Romer v. Evans,26 United States v. Virginia27 and the
considerably earlier case of City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc.28 These three cases stand for the proposition that when a particu-
lar group is singled out for unbridled animus or prejudice, the tradi-
tionally highly deferential rational basis standard of review is no
longer the appropriate standard. 9 In that situation, legislation now
must pass a much more vigorous review."
dant was arrested and charged with violating the Texas criminal statute for engaging in private,
consensual sexual relations.
26. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
27. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
28. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
29. Until the 1970s, the Equal Protection Clause was interpreted solely as a protection
against discrimination based on race or national origin. The Court employed a two-tiered ana-
lytical approach. Nearly all classifications, except those based on "suspect" classifications such
as race or national origin, were upheld as long as they were at all rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose. The standard for determining a legitimate government purpose and what
means were rationally related to that purpose, however, was extremely deferential. Government
action assessed under this rational basis test was permissible if there was any conceivable basis
for it. Most classifications were examined under this rationality standard; under such deferential
review, invalidation of legislation was uncommon. Dubnoff, supra note 6, at 308. See Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) (striking down an Alabama tax scheme that
favored its own residents). Nonetheless, no similar presumption of constitutionality existed
when the government employed a classification that the Court had designated as suspect or when
government action affected the exercise of a fundamental right. In those instances, the Court
required the State to demonstrate that it had a compelling interest in the classification, and that
the methods it selected were narrowly implemented to effect that interest. See, e.g., In re Grif-
fiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973). The strict scrutiny standard has been described as "'strict' in
theory and fatal in fact." Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court: A Modelfor Newer Equal Protec-
tion, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
The notion that some types of classifications may be "suspect" and require heightened scru-
tiny has its origin in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Writing for the Court,
Justice Black stated that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group
are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to
say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny." Id. at 216. The Court went on,
nonetheless, to uphold the removal of Japanese-Americans from designated military zones with-
out requiring the evidence that strict scrutiny would seem to require. Id. at 219. Since Kore-
matsu, the Court has been more rigorous in applying the strict scrutiny standard, invalidating
almost all classifications that come under it. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984)
(invalidating a Florida Court order awarding custody to the father of a child when the mother
became involved in an interracial marriage).
This two-tiered analysis yielded to a more complicated system. During the 1970s, the Court
created an intermediate level of review. Originating with gender classifications, the notion has
been extended to other categories. For classifications falling within the intermediate category,
the government must demonstrate an important interest and a substantial relationship of the
classifications to the interest. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (striking down
an Illinois law that prevented children born out of wedlock from inheriting from their fathers
unless paternity had been acknowledged in a judicial proceeding prior to the father's death).
Matt Coles of the ACLU Gay and Lesbian Project, who wrote the appellate brief in the Kansas
challenge, argued that it was obvious the same-sex sodomy statute violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution. He claimed that such a classification could not withstand even a
rational basis analysis. Appellant's Brief at 7, City of Topeka v. Movsovitz, No. 77-332 (Kan.
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Romer's test for the legitimacy of legislation is the progeny of the
Supreme Court's analysis in City of Cleburne.31 In City of Cleburne, a
zoning ordinance prohibited the establishment of a group home for the
mentally retarded.3 2  According to the Supreme Court, the city,
through its zoning requirements, could not avoid the Equal Protection
Clause by claiming it was deferring to the wishes of some "faction of
the body politic."33 The Court decided that "a bare... desire to harm
a politically unpopular group" is not a legitimate objective to justify a
zoning ordinance.3 4 Thus, negative attitudes or fear are not a permis-
sible basis for treating the mentally retarded different from others.
One of the City's arguments to justify the zoning ordinance was
that the home was located across the street from a junior high school
and therefore the student body might be at risk. The Court dismissed
this attempt at demonstrating a rational basis by stating that denying
the home its permit would give credence to "vague, undifferentiated
fears."3 Further, the Court rejected, under rational basis scrutiny, all
other reasons the City gave: avoiding a concentration of population,
lessening the congestion of the streets, preventing fire hazards, pre-
serving the serenity of the neighborhood, and avoiding dangers to
other residents.36 According to the Court, the City's decision to disal-
low the house was based solely on "irrational prejudice against the
mentally retarded."37
In City of Cleburne, Justice Stevens advocates replacing the rigid
'three-tier system' with a question based approach. He suggests that
instead of trying to fit equal protection cases into the three categories,
Ct. App. 1998). Further, Coles said Romer stands for the proposition that when legislation
imposes special disabilities against lesbian and gays, that the state must then offer a legitimate
purpose for such legislation. Id. at 8. Obviously, Coles is correct. This argument can now be
made stronger. Two cases now support the concept that the majority reacts negatively when
prejudice is shown. Additionally, it is now possible to predict the escape routes courts will use in
their attempt to downplay or distinguish Romer.
30. Romer can be read as a fundamental rights case based on Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 497 (1965). This case states "that where fundamental liberties are involved, they may
not be abridged by the states simply on a showing that a regulatory statute has some rational
relationship to the effectuation of a proper state purpose." Id. Strict scrutiny is therefore a
heightened level of review, aimed at providing greater protection for fundamental rights. See also
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
Similar supervision by the courts is due when state laws infringe on personal rights preserved by
the Constitution. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No, 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
31. 473 U.S. 432.
32. Id. at 448.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 447 (quoting U.S.D.A. v. Moreno, 412 U.S. 528, 543 (1973)).
35. Id. at 449.




a better approach is to determine what class is harmed by the legisla-
tion and whether that class has been subjected to a tradition of disfa-
vor by our laws: "[w]hat is the public purpose that is being served by
the law [and] [w]hat is the characteristic of the disadvantaged class
that justifies the disparate treatment?"38 Justice Stevens' approach is
sometimes referred to as "rational basis with bite."
In the post-Romer case United States v. Virginia39 Justice Scalia
has suggested that the majority has abandoned the established stand-
ard for reviewing classifications.4" There, the Virginia Military Insti-
tute (VMI), a state school, was a male-only institution designed to
prepare young men for military service.4 The Supreme Court, with
Justice Ginsburg writing the majority opinion, decided that VMI's
policy of not admitting women was based on prejudice regarding
women's abilities and roles.42 Thus, the state had to offer justifica-
tions that were "exceedingly persuasive."43 According to Scalia, all the
Court was supposed to do was inquire "whether the statutory classifi-
cation is 'substantially related to an important governmental objec-
tive."'44 Instead, the majority discarded this rigid standard.
Thus, in light of Virginia, Cleburne, and Romer, it can be argued
that, in substance, if not in form, when animus against a group is the
motivating factor for legislation or governmental policy, the Supreme
Court majority is willing to abandon its rigid three-tier approach and
apply a less-deferential rational basis test. This modified approach is
sometimes referred to as "rational basis with bite."4 The government
38. Id. at 453.
39. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
40. Id. at 520.
41. It is the mission of the school:
to produce educated and honorable men, prepared for the varied work of civil life,
imbued with love of learning, confident in the functions and attitudes of leadership,
possessing a high sense of public service, advocates of the American democracy and
free enterprise system, and ready as citizen-soldiers to defend their country in time of
national peril.
Id. at 521 (quoting MISSION STUDY COMMITTEE OF THE VMI BOARD OF VISITORS, Report,
May 16, 1986)).
42. "The United States does not challenge any expert witness estimation on average capaci-
ties or preferences of men and women. Instead, the United States emphasizes that time and
again since this Court's turning point decision in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), we have cau-
tioned reviewing courts to take a 'hard look' at generalizations or 'tendencies' of the kind pressed
by Virginia, and relied upon by the District Court." Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Portia's Pro-
gress, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV 1546, 1551 (1991). "We have instructed that state actors controlling
gates to opportunity, may not exclude qualified individuals based on fixed notions concerning
the roles and abilities of males and females." Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 725 (1982); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 541.
43. 518 U.S. at 533.
44. Id. at 570-71.
45. See generally Gayle Lynn Pettina, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any
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can no longer offer reasons rooted in prejudice, bias and fears.
Instead, the government must demonstrate with actual facts that the
legislation promotes the general welfare.
Not only can this line of reasoning be used to challenge sodomy
statutes on the basis of equal protection, but Scalia notes that some-
thing else happens when a deferential test is used: Bowers is over-
ruled.46 As Scalia observes, "if it is constitutionally permissible for a
state to make homosexual conduct criminal, surely it is constitution-
ally permissible for a state to enact other laws merely disfavoring
homosexual conduct."47  Since the majority in Romer decided that
legislation that was motivated only by animus against gays and lesbi-
ans did not have a legitimate state purpose, and therefore would fail
under even the usually highly deferential rational basis test of the
Equal Protection Clause, then it follows, according to Scalia, that Bow-
ers must no longer be good law.4" "After all, there can hardly be more
palpable discrimination against a class than making the conduct that
defines the class criminal."49
Although the majority in Romer does not cite to Bowers, Scalia
argues that the majority's holding means that Bowers can no longer
constitutionally stand for the principle that it is permissible to single
out a group of people based on their innate characteristics and make
those characteristics criminal. Since the Court in Bowers effectively
held that a homosexual can be discriminated against based on innate
characteristics, Romer overrules Bowers whether the majority explicitly
says so or not. This is especially true because Bowers permitted state
criminalization of homosexual acts, with the attendant possibilities of
imprisonment." Romer, on the other hand, involved simple discrimi-
nation against homosexuals."' According to Scalia, the impact of being
Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779 (1982).
46. Romer, 517 U.S. at 643. The Supreme Court of Colorado stated: "We hold that the
portions of Amendment 2 that would remain if only the provisions concerning sexual orientation
were stricken are not autonomous and thus, not severable." Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335,
1349 (Colo. 1994). That statement was premised on on the proposition that "[the] four charac-
teristics [described in the Amendment-sexual orientation, conduct, practices, and relationships]
are not truly severable from one another because each provides nothing more than a different
way of identifying the same class of persons." Id. at 1349-50. If the premise is true-if the
entire class affected by the Amendment takes part in homosexual conduct, practices and relation-
ships-Bowers alone suffices to answer all constitutional objections. Separate consideration of
persons of homosexual orientation is necessary only if one believes (as the Supreme Court of
Colorado did not) that that is a distinct class. It is also possible to analyze United States v. Vir-
ginia as abandoning the middle tier now used for sex discrimination cases.
47. Romer, 517 U.S. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
48. See id.
49. Id. (quoting Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (1987)).
50. See generally Bowers, 478 U.S. 186.
51. See generally Romer, 517 U.S. 620.
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criminalized is much greater than that of being discriminated
against.52 Thus, if lawmakers cannot utilize antigay animus as a legiti-
mate state purpose in state legislation, then surely lawmakers cannot
make one a criminal for engaging in the very actions that define the
class against which animus is prohibited.
Thus, counsel possesses two new arguments in challenging a
same-sex sodomy statute. The first is to stress that since these statutes
single out homosexuals, they are based on nothing more than preju-
dice unless the state can otherwise justify the classification. Since
prejudice is the motivating factor behind almost all sodomy laws, par-
ticularly those targeting only same-gender sodomy, sodomy laws should
not pass constitutional muster under Romer. Second, states should be
precluded from raising Bowers as a response to a "rational basis with
bite" analysis. Scalia himself can be cited as indicating Bowers has
been effectively overruled.53
B. Morality Cannot Be Used to Justify Sodomy Statutes
The Kansas court that declined to overturn the Kansas same-sex
sodomy law reasoned that such statutes are justified merely on the
basis of a general concept of morality held by a majority of the popu-
lace."4 However, using morality as a basis for justifying discrimination
52. Id. at 641.
53. Id.
54. City of Topeka v. Movsovitz, No. 77-332, slip op. 6-7 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998). But see
Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) (involving arguments comparable to
Movsovitz). In Wasson, the defendant was charged with soliciting deviate sexual intercourse.
The issue before the Kentucky court was whether KY. REV. STAT. § 510.100 (1990), punishing
"deviate sexual intercourse with another person of the same sex," was constitutional. Id. at 488.
Just as in Wasson, the state of Kansas advanced morality as support for upholding KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-3505, which defines criminal sodomy. Similar to the government's argument in the
Kansas appeal,
The thrust of the argument advanced by [Kentucky] as a rational basis for criminal-
izing consensual intercourse between persons of the same sex, when the same acts
between persons of the opposite sex are not punished, is that the level of moral indig-
nation felt by the majority of society against the sexual preference of homosexuals
justifies having their legislative representatives criminalize these sexual activities.
[Kentucky] believes that homosexual intercourse is immoral, and that what is beyond
the pale of majoritarian morality is beyond the limits of constitutional protection.
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 490. Kentucky, unlike Kansas, did not find the morality argument to be
adequate to uphold the sodomy statute.
The Wasson court found the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding in Commonwealth v.
Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (1980), influential. In Bonadio, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court likewise
considered the issue of upholding its sodomy statue on the basis of morality and the police power
of the state.
The Montana Supreme Court also addressed the issue of morality in GTyczan v. State, 942
P.2d 112, 125 (1997), stating "it does not follow.., that simply because the legislature has
enacted as law what may be a moral choice of the majority, the courts are, thereafter, bound to
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has been suspect at least since Loving v. Virginia.5 Prior to Loving,
the justification for prohibiting inter-racial marriage was morality.16 It
was 'unspeakable' to think of allowing blacks and whites to marry.
5 7
simply acquiesce." Id. (The Supreme Court of Montana ruled that private consensual, non-
commercial sexual conduct is protected by Montana's constitutional right of individual privacy.)
Those who challenged the Tennessee sodomy statute successfully argued that the moral val-
ues of Tennessee citizens are unsubstantiated and that the majoritarian morality is not a valid
basis for diminishing the conduct of an unpopular minority in the absence of any evidence that
the actions of the minority harm other members of society. Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d
250, 264 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). The court cited Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), in
which the United States Supreme Court stated, "A way of life that is odd or even erratic, but
interferes with no rights or interests of others, is not to be condemned because it is different." Id.
at 613. The Tennessee court also quoted the majority opinion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), in which the Court stated that the Constitution "is made for people of fundamentally
differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar, or novel,
and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question of whether statutes
embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States." Id. at 113 (quoting Loch-
ner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76. (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
55. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). In Loving, a white male and a black female, both
Virginia residents, were legally married in the District of Columbia. Id. at 2. Upon returning to
Virginia, they were convicted of violating a state statute prohibiting interracial marriage. Id. at
2-3. The Court unanimously reversed the convictions, holding that the statute was unconstitu-
tional because it was based on invidious racial discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 12. Rejecting the State's contention that the statute did not constitute an
invidious discrimination because it applied equally to blacks and whites, the Court maintained
that a racial classification must still be subjected to strict scrutiny. Id. at 8-9. The Court then
concluded that no legitimate purpose existed to support the racial classification. Id. at 11. "We
have consistently denied the constitutionality of measures which restrict the rights of citizens on
account of race. There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of
racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 12.
56. See Andrew Koppelman, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimina-
tion, 98 YALE L.J. 145 (1988) (using antimiscegenation doctrine to illustrate the invidious harm
purpose of sodomy laws).
The purity of public morals, the moral and physical development of both races, the
highest advancement of our cherished southern civilization, under which two distinct
races are to work out and accomplish the destiny to which the Almighty has assigned
them on this continent-all require that they should be kept distinct and separate, and
the connections and alliances so unnatural that God and nature seem to forbid them,
should be prohibited by positive law, and be subject to no evasion.
Kinney v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 858, 869 (1878).
See Davis, Intermarriage in Caste Societies, 43 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 376, 389 (1941)
(since marriage between races would create mixed-race heirs, 'either intermarriage must be strict-
ly forbidden or racial caste abandoned'); Walter Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia's Anti-
Miscegenation Statute in Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1189, 1190 (1966) (providing a
historical framework of Virginia's miscegenation laws and its obstacles); Sidney L. Moore, Note,
19 MERCER L. REV. 255, 257 (1968) (calculating that Loving stands for a basic change in social
philosophy that will seemingly endure for many years).
57. Evidently, the first public record of punishing sexual relations between blacks and
whites is noted in colonial Virginia in 1630, where a white man was "to be soundly whipped
before an assembly of Negroes and others for abusing himself to the dishonor of God and shame
of Christians by defiling his body in lying with a Negro; which fault he is to acknowledge next
Sabbath day." Wadlington, supra note 56, at 1191, n.9. For a historical analysis of miscegena-
tion statutes in the United States as well as the Supreme Court's approach in addressing equal
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Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court realized that the moral
rhetoric did nothing more than disguise society's bias against African-
Americans. When the Court declared there "was patently no legiti-
mate overriding purpose" to the miscegenation statute, it made a sig-
nificant step towards requiring a legitimate public purpose behind
legislation other than mere majoritarian morality."8
If majoritarian morality is used as a justification, counsel should
bring to the court's attention that Justice Kennedy recognized the
invidiousness of prejudice disguised as morality in Romer. It is not
accidental that the majority decision in Romer starts with a quote from
Plessy v. Ferguson.9 Kennedy reasoned that the legislation in question
in Romer, like that in Plessy, was rooted in bare prejudice disguised as
morality.6" Clearly, Romer stands for the proposition that any time
morality is used as a justification, there must be a legitimate public
purpose other than the mere recitation of majoritarian morality.61 The
Court states:
Even in the ordinary equal protection case calling for the most
deferential standards, we insist on knowing the relation between
the classification adopted and the object to be obtained. The
search for the link between classification and objective gives
substance to the Equal Protection Clause; it provides guidance
and discipline for the legislature, which is entitled to know what
sort of law it can pass; and it marks the limit of our own author-
ity.
6 2
protection issues as described in Loving v. Virginia, see Laurence C. Nolan, The Meaning of
Loving: Marriage, Due Process and Equal Protection (1967-1990) as Equality and Marriage, from
Loving to Zablocki, 41 HOW. L.J. 245 (1998).
58. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11. A later episode in the constitutional history of miscegenation
came in Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), where the Court reversed a state court's decision
to strip a white mother of the custody of her child because of her remarriage to a black man. The
Court left undisturbed the lower court's finding that the child, if raised by the interracial couple,
would suffer from 'social stigmatization.' Id. at 431 (emphasis deleted). It held, nonetheless,
that '[t]he Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. Private
biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them
effect.' Id. at 433. But cf. Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 81 (N.D. 1981) (reversing
custody award to mother, where living in same house with her lesbian lover would have caused
children to 'suffer from the slings and arrows of a disapproving society').
59. Id. (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
60. Id.
61. Seeid.at623.
62. Id. at 632.
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C. Sodomy Statutes Cannot Be Justified on the
Separation of Status and Acts
The Kansas Court of Appeals attempted to limit Romer to the
status or condition of being queer,63 rather than the act of engaging in
same-sex intimate relations. The court claimed, moreover, that the
Kansas sodomy statute only governed the acts of homosexuals, not the
status of being a homosexual.64 Thus, according to the Kansas Court
of Appeals, the sodomy statute was not inconsistent with Romer and
was constitutional.6" Counsel should argue that this interpretation is
not plausible. First, to suggest that one's identity is separated into
status and acts is to misunderstand what it means to be human. Ironi-
cally, in Romer, Justice Scalia adopts exactly this position." As Scalia
observes, attempting to divide homosexuals into those with an orien-
tation or status as distinct from those who act upon their orientation is
a distinction without a difference.67 Scalia quotes two court decisions
63. City of Topeka v. Movsovitz, No. 77-332, slip. op. (Kan. Ct. App. 1998).
64. Id. at 15.
65. Id.
66. 517 U.S. at 640-41.
67. Id. The genesis of the split between status and conduct can be seen in Bowers, where
the court made an internally inconsistent attempt to distinguish conduct and status. A more
recent illustration of a court using this distinction to strike down antigay federal action can be
seen in Cammermeyer v. Perry, 97 F.3d 1235, 1237 (9th Cir. 1996), which discussed the relation-
ship between homosexual status and homosexual conduct. In Cammermeyer, Colonel Marga-
rethe Cammermeyer was a decorated nurse who had served in the Army, Army Reserve, and
National Guard. She had received many awards and honors, including the Bronze Star for distin-
guished service in Vietnam, and had held the position of Chief Nurse at a number of military
hospitals. While seeking admission to the Army War College, Cammermeyer was interviewed
by the Defense Investigative Service in order to acquire a Top Secret security clearance. During
the interview, she was asked about her sexual orientation. In a statement signed during the inter-
view, she wrote, "I am a Lesbian. Lesbianism is an orientation I have, emotional in nature,
towards women. It does not imply sexual activity." Id. at 1236.
At the time these statements were made, Cammermeyer was serving as member of the Wash-
ington State National Guard. The Guard permitted Cammermeyer to retain her position, stating
that it would not pursue her discharge unless forced to do so by the Department of the Army.
Six months later, the United States Army launched proceedings to withdraw Cammermeyer's
federal recognition and thereby rendered her ineligible for military service. While these pro-
ceedings were pending, Washington Governor Booth Gardner sought to intervene on Cammer-
meyer's behalf, writing a letter to then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney protesting "a senseless
end to the career of a distinguished, long-time member of the armed services." Id. at 1236.
Notwithstanding uniform and resounding praise for Cammermeyer's abilities, both as a nurse
and a leader, the Army ultimately withdrew Cammermeyer's federal recognition, causing her to
be discharged from the National Guard. See Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 929-30
(W.D. Wash. 1994). The district court then ordered that Cammermeyer be reinstated, that all
of defendants' records concerning Cammermeyer's sexual orientation be expunged, and that
defendants be enjoined from taking any action against Cammermeyer on account of her homo-
sexual status. Id. at 929. The district court also declared that Cammermeyer's discharge exclu-
sively on the basis of her sexual orientation was unconstitutional, and that Army Reg. 135-175,
which allowed for discharge on that basis, was unconstitutional as well. Id. Pending appeal,
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to make this point. In the first, a federal district court decision, the
court says, "it is virtually impossible to distinguish or separate indi-
viduals of a particular orientation which predisposes them toward a
particular sexual conduct from those who actually engage in that par-
ticular conduct."6" Further, according to Scalia, the Supreme Court of
Colorado also comes to the same conclusion.' That court says that
attempting to divide a class of people into sexual orientation, conduct,
practices, and relationships is just a way of identifying a class of per-
sons who are gay.7" "These four characteristics are not truly severable
from one another because each provides nothing more than a different
way of identifying the same class of persons."71 These observations by
Scalia give counsel ample ammunition to challenge a court's attempt to
divide status from act.
Second, it is possible to argue that some sodomy cases are really
focused on status, not acts. It is not unusual to find sodomy cases that
are the product of police sting operations.72 Cops cruise parks until
Cammermeyer was reinstated, and Army Reg. 135-175 and Department Defense Directive
1332.30 were replaced with 10 U.S.C. § 654 and a new version of Department of Defense Direc-
tive 1332.30. These new regulations implemented the "don't ask/don't tell policy." Id. at 920,
924.
In Meinhold v. United States Department of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1479 (9th Cir.1994), it was
held that regulations identical to Army Reg. 135-175 did not require discharge on the basis of
statements merely expressing one's status as a homosexual. Id. at 1479-80. Rather, the regula-
tions required discharge only for statements "that show a concrete, fixed, or expressed desire to
commit homosexual acts." Id. at 1479. In light of Meinhold, defendants conceded that Cam-
mermeyer should not have been separated solely on the basis of her statements. Defendants
argued, however, that, under the reasoning of Meinhold, the district court should not have
reached Cammermeyer's constitutional claims. Id. at 1474.
Cf. Holmes v. California Army Nat'l Guard, 920 F. Supp. 1510 (N.D. Cal. 1996). The dis-
trict court, ordering the reinstatement into the California National Guard of First Lt. Andrew
Holmes, saw the "don't ask, don't tell policy in a similar vein. Id. at 1534. The court in its view
of that case observed that the drafters of the "don't ask, don't tell policy "merged the concepts of
status and conduct in an attempt to circumvent the constitutional proscriptions." Id.
68. Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 689-93 (D.C. 1994).
69. The Supreme Court of Colorado stated: "We hold that the portions of Amendment 2
that would remain if only the provision concerning sexual orientation were stricken are not auto-
nomous and thus, not severable." Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d. 1335, 1349 (Colo. 1994). That
statement was premised, however, on the proposition that "[the] four characteristics [described
in the Amendment-sexual orientation, conduct, practices, and relationships] are not truly sever-
able from one another because each provides nothing more than a different way of identifying the
same class of persons." Id. at 1349-50.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Laurence Hammack, Jury Acquits Man of Sex Solicitation He Was the 2nd Person
Charged in Police's Effort at Wasena Park, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Aug. 13, 1999,
at B1 ("After hearing how a detective posing as a homosexual 'cruiser' in Wasena Park spent
more than two hours trying to get Huffman to say something incriminating, a circuit Court jury
found the 28 year old not guilty of soliciting the officer for oral sex."); Peter S. Goodman, Anti-
Gay Bias Alleged in Md. Sex Law; ACLU Suit Demands Equal Treatment Under Criminal Statutes,
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they finally persuade gay men to talk to them. The conversations are
typically as follows:
Cop: Nice day, what's your name?
Man: Max. What do you do?
Cop: I go to the university, etc., etc. (then after casual conversa-
tion)
Cop: What would you do for me?
Man: Sex-wise?
Cop: Yes.
Man: Nothing in the park, it's illegal.
Cop: But, what would you do?
Man: Well, I like oral sex.
Cop: You're under arrest, etc.73
These words are not acts; they are purely speech, nothing more,
nothing less. So, if the courts say the legislation can make such con-
versations criminal, the criminality is based purely on the status of the
person. In other words, if the acts of sodomy themselves are criminal
when committed by members of the same sex, but not criminal when
committed by heterosexuals, then the criminalization of the speech as,
presumably, a conspiracy to commit sodomy, is based on the gender of
the persons speaking, not the acts that they are conspiring to commit.
No act has taken place. A fundamental principle of criminal law is
that a person will not be punished for what he or she thinks or says.74
WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1998, at D05 ("The ACLU became interested in the case when it was
contacted by Stephen B. Mercer, an attorney for an Arundel County man who was arrested for
allegedly propositioning an undercover police officer. According to Mercer, the man merely dis-
cussed oral sex with the officer, and not for money. They were on their way to the man's apart-
ment when the officer arrested him."); Editorial, The Wrong Way to Deter Sex in the Parks,
ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Nov. 24, 1998, at A12 ("The state law, of course, is rarely
enforced. Imagine the uproar if police were breaking into homes and arresting married couples
for having oral sex subjecting them to up to five years in prison if convicted. Imagine how much
greater the outrage if police were arresting heterosexuals for simply discussing oral sex with each
other. Yet this hypocritical state law is the basis for the arrests of those 18 men, and if that is not
targeting homosexuals, it is wrongful use of a law that should have been repealed years ago.").
73. Interview with Max Movsovitz, named defendant in City of Topeka v. Movsovitz
(notes on file with the author).
74. One basic premise of Anglo-American criminal law is that no crime can be committed
by bad thoughts alone. Something in the way of an act, or an omission to act where there is a
legal duty to act, is required too. The common law crimes are defined in terms of act or omission
to act, and statutory crimes are unconstitutional unless so defined. A statute purporting to
criminalize the act of thinking bad thoughts would, in the United States, be held unconstitu-
tional. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW, (West 2d ed. 1986). E.g. In re Leroy T., 403
A.2d 1226 (Md. 1979); Ex parte Smith, 36 S.W. 628 (Mo. 1896); State v. Labato, 80 A.2d 617
(N.J. 1951); Proctor v. State, 176 P. 771 (Okla. 1918); Lambert v. State, 374 P.2d 783 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1962); Note, 30 YALE L.J. 762 (1921).
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The few exceptions to this rule do not apply to these types of sodomy
cases.
75
In the context of police enforcement of sodomy laws in the man-
ner discussed above, a somewhat different strategy is called for in
states that do not legislatively distinguish between heterosexual and
homosexual sodomy. In those states, the act of sodomy is illegal, no
matter who commits it. In those states, however, the laws against sod-
omy are almost never, if ever, enforced against heterosexuals. This
difference in enforcement of the laws can also give rise to an equal
protection claim.
Counsel, in considering the strategies discussed herein, must
always weigh the practicalities of making arguments that, while emi-
nently logical and consistent with equal protection, are at odds with
existing case law such as Bowers v. Hardwick. Fortunately, as Justice
Scalia has so wisely observed, Bowers has been rendered largely irrele-
vant to the extent a challenge to a sodomy statute is based on equal
protection and not privacy.7 6 Nevertheless, as Kansas has unfortu-
nately demonstrated, the recent successes in Kentucky, Tennessee,
and Montana do not signal the final death of Bowers.
The logical inconsistencies in United States jurisprudence in the
area of same-sex criminalization can also be highlighted through the
use of comparative and international law. As noted in the Introduc-
tion, international law provides compelling reasons why United States
judges are obligated to interpret United States laws consistently with
our country's international obligations whenever possible. The use of
international law and comparative law, however, also helps demon-
strate that our country's jurisprudence is now seriously in conflict with
the jurisprudence of the international community and the domestic
laws of the countries with which our courts like to compare the United
States.
75. See generally 18 U.S.C.A. § 871 (1994).
Threats against the President and successors to the Presidency (a) Whoever know-
ingly and willfully deposits for conveyance in the mail or for a delivery from any post
office or by any letter carrier any letter, paper, writing, print, missive, or document
containing any threat to take the life of, to kidnap, or to inflict bodily harm upon the
President of the United States, the President-elect, the Vice President or other officer
next in the order of succession to the office of President of the United States, or the
Vice President-elect, or knowingly and willfully otherwise makes any such threat
against the President, President-elect, Vice President or other officer next in the order
of succession to the office of President, or Vice President-elect, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Id.
76. Romer, 517 U.S. at 641.
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III. INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE STRATEGIES TO
CHALLENGE U.S. SODOMY LAWS
A party arguing international and comparative law in United
States courts must confront two obstacles: (1) the nonbinding nature
of much of the international law to which the United States is a party,
and (2) the skeptical manner in which many judges view international
and comparative law. There are at least two strategies for addressing
these obstacles.
The first strategy addresses the obstacles to using nonbinding
international law, such as non self-executing treaties,77 in domestic
courts. This first strategy consists of a separation of powers and fed-
eralism argument using well-settled Supreme Court precedence that
judges should, whenever possible, interpret domestic law in accor-
dance with the federal government's international law obligations.
71
To do otherwise would place the judiciary in the position of subvert-
ing the federal government's conduct of foreign policy. To some
extent, this is a separation of powers argument that judges should not
interfere with the federal government's conduct of foreign policy. In
the context of state court litigation, federalism requires that states, and
state courts, refrain from interfering with the ability of the United
States to speak with one voice in its conduct of foreign affairs.
The second strategy is to demonstrate to the court that, with the
exception of certain states in the United States, all of the industrialized
democratic nations of the world, including culturally disparate coun-
tries such as Japan, Taiwan, Australia, Canada, South Africa, and
Russia, reject the crimninalization of same-sex consensual sexual rela-
tions. 7' The United States, as a self-proclaimed political leader of
these democratic nations and a self-proclaimed subscriber to funda-
mental human rights.norms, can do no less.
The following discussion presents the first strategy.
77. This Article will not address the use of international law that is binding on domestic
United States courts, such as self-executing treaties and customary international law. Self-exe-
cuting treaties are not addressed because they have the same force in United States domestic law
as domestic statutes and are treated similarly by United States courts. Accordingly, there are no
particular obstacles to their use in domestic litigation. Customary international law, which is also
binding on United States domestic courts, will not be addressed since there is little authority that
the criminalization of same-gender relations would, at the present time, constitute a violation of
customary international law, although some commentators have argued that it does, or at least
should. This is not to say. that sodomy law will definitely not be considered a violation of cus-
tomary international law at some point in the future. It does not appear, however, that the norm
has yet matured into a binding rule of international law.
78. See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
79. See generally Wilets, supra note 1, at 34.
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A. Arguing the Inconsistency Between State Sodomy Laws and
United States Obligations Under International Law
Counsel's first argument should be that a court's upholding of a
state sodomy law would violate established principles of international
law, including a treaty to which the United States is a party, and con-
travenes explicit federal policy regarding our nation's compliance with
these international norms.
State sodomy statutes clearly contravene the obligations of the
United States under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, as well as under international law generally.8° In 1992, the
United States became a party to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1 The United States has declared that
certain provisions of the ICCPR are not self-executing, in the sense
that the terms of the ratification of the treaty do not provide for an
independent cause of action in domestic courts for enforcement of its
provisions.8 2 The doctrine of self-execution is itself a judicially cre-
ated exception to the clear words of Article VI of the United States
Constitution, which states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, and Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.83
Nevertheless, the discussion below demonstrates that federal and
state law should be interpreted in accordance with the United States'
international obligations under international law, including treaties to
which the United States is a party but which are not self-executing,
such as the ICCPR.
In 1994, the United Nations Human Rights Committee (Com-
mittee), the body charged with interpreting the ICCPR, ruled that a
sodomy statute in the Australian state of Tasmania violated the non-
discrimination and privacy provisions of the ICCPR.84 This ruling
confirmed a trend already present in international law. In three sepa-
rate opinions, the European Court of Human Rights, with jurisdiction
80. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
81. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966).
82. Id.
83. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
84. See Toonen v. Australia, Comm. No. 488/1992 U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 50th
Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/c/50/D/488/1992 (1994).
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over all countries in the Council of Europe, has ruled that sodomy
laws violate the "right to privacy" under the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights.8"
In Toonen v. Australia, the Committee addressed the Australian
State of Tasmania Criminal Code §§ 122(a), (c) and 123, which crimi-
nalized various forms of sexual contact between men, including all
forms of sexual contact between consenting adult homosexual men in
private.86
In its decision, the Committee ruled that Tasmania's sodomy law
violated Articles 2(1) and 17 of the ICCPR which state respectively:
Each state party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to
its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, lan-
guage, religion, political or other opinion, national or social ori-
gin, property, birth or other status.
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interfer-
ence with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor
to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against
such interference or attacks.
8 7
In its opinion, the Committee declared that "it is undisputed that
adult consensual sexual activity in private is covered by the concept of
'privacy" ,8 Relying on General Comment [16] 32 to interpret
Article 17 of the ICCPR, the Committee stated that "interference
provided for by the law should be ... in any event, reasonable in the
circumstances. In reaching its conclusion that the infringement of
Toonen's right to privacy was not reasonable, the Committee inter-
preted "the requirement of reasonableness to imply that any interfer-
ence with privacy must be proportional to the end sought and be
85. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, amended by Protocols
Nos. 3 and 5, entered into force Sept. 21, 1970, and Dec. 21, 1971 respectively; see also Dudgeon
v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981); Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) (1991); Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).
86. See generally Toonen v. Australia, Comm. No. 488/1992 UN. GAOR Hum. Rts.
Comm., 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/c/50/D/488/1992 (1994).
87. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 81.
88. Toonen, 8.2.




necessary in the circumstances of any given case." 90 The Committee
found that the arbitrary nature of the Tasmanian sodomy statute vio-
lated this reasonableness requirement.91
In finding the Tasmanian sodomy statute violative of the nondis-
crimination provision of the ICCPR, the Committee specifically rejected
Tasmania's argument that the statute did not discriminate between classes
of citizens, but merely identified acts that are unacceptable to the commu-
nity.
The United Nations Human Rights Committee's decision
reflects an authoritative interpretation of the ICCPR, with respect to
statutes criminalizing same sex relations. This ruling strongly sug-
gests that a court's upholding of a state's sodomy law would place the
United States in breach of its international obligations under the
ICCPR.
B. The Effect of Rules of Judicial Construction
Rules of judicial construction provide that federal and state law,
wherever possible, should be interpreted in accordance with the inter-
national obligations of the United States. This rule of construction is
particularly strengthened where the United States has committed itself
to conform its state and federal laws with its ICCPR obligations. The
United States government has committed itself to implement, at all
levels of the United States government, the rights guaranteed under
the ICCPR. The ICCPR, and the pledge of the United States gov-
ernment to implement the provisions of that treaty, constitute federal
policy.
The United States Senate, in its advice and consent to the
ICCPR's ratification, stated:
The United States understands that this Covenant shall be
implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it
exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters
covered therein, and otherwise by the states and local govern-
ments; to the extent that state and local governments exercise
jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal Government shall
take measures appropriate to the Federal system to the end that
the competent authorities of the state or local governments may
take appropriate measures for the fulfillment of the Covenant.92
The United States, in its official report to the Committee on its
compliance with the ICCPR, reiterated its commitment to bring the
90. Id. 8.3.
91. Id.
92. 138 CONG. REC. S4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2,1992).
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laws of its respective states into compliance with United States obliga-
tions under the ICCPR.93 This included those provisions of the
ICCPR invoked by the Committee in Toonen.94
Two of the comments by the Human Rights Committee, made
in response to the reports submitted by the United States, on its com-
pliance with the ICCPR, are particularly relevant to the issues this
Article raises. Comments nine and eleven of the Committee's
response to the United States report state:
9. The Committee welcomes the efforts of the Federal Gov-
ernment to take measures at the legislative, judicial and adminis-
trative levels to ensure that the States of the Union provide human
rights and fundamental freedoms. It further appreciates the
expression of readiness by the Government to take such measures as
may be necessary to ensure that the States of the Union implement
the rights guaranteed by the Covenant.
11. The Committee takes note of the position expressed by the
delegation that, notwithstanding the non-self-executing declara-
tion of the United States, courts of the United States are not pre-
vented from seeking guidance from the Covenant in interpreting
United States law.95
It is a well settled principle of judicial construction that state and
federal law, where fairly possible, should be interpreted in accordance
with the international obligations of the United States, including those
obligations that arise under treaties to which the United States is a
party.96 This rule of judicial construction applies even when a treaty is
not self-executing in the United States. 97 In Moore v. Ganim, the Con-
necticut Supreme Court observed that "even a non-self-executing
treaty of the United States, not effective as law until implemented by
legislative or executive action, may sometimes be held to be a federal
policy and therefore would supersede state law or policy."98 This rule
of construction is rendered all the more applicable in the case of the
93. Initial Report of the United States of America, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/81/Add.4 (1994) and HR1/CORE/1/Add.49 (1995).
94. Id.
95. Consideration of Reports Submitted by the States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant:
Comments of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 53rd Sess., U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.50 (1995) (emphasis added).
96. See, e.g., Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 114.
97. See 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 66. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 cmt. e (1987).
98. Moore v. Ganim, 660 A.2d 742, 780-82 (Conn. 1995) (Peters, C.J., concurring) (rely-
ing on international treaties' guarantees of right to a minimum standard of subsistence in inter-
preting Connecticut Constitution's preamble and "social compact" clause).
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights because the Unit-
ed States Senate has explicitly acknowledged that the ICCPR provides
guidance for courts when interpreting United States domestic law.99
This rule of construction arises because non-self-executing trea-
ties create binding international obligations for the United States with
regard to other countries and the international community at large,
even if they are not binding as such on United States courts. Courts
should be reluctant to interpret the Constitution or statutes in a man-
ner that creates problems for the federal government in conducting
foreign affairs. 0
As Justice Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court points out, "if [a]
court were not to accept this view, then [a] court might well find itself
running afoul of national policy as expressed by the United States gov-
ernment through its participation in international human rights
activities and declarations."'0 1 These statements strongly suggest that
the United States views its treaty obligations as making up part of the
United States "federal policy" which, consistent with the Supremacy
Clause, may "supersede state law or policy.'
10 2
C. Using Foreign Comparative Law as Persuasive Authority
When interpreting the rights to privacy and equal protection
under state constitutions, counsel is advised to utilize foreign com-
parative law as persuasive support. Many state courts, when respond-
ing to challenges to state sodomy laws, decline to follow the reasoning
of the Bowers majority and find their states' sodomy statutes unconsti-
tutional under their respective constitutions. Examples include Ken-
tucky, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
and Texas." 3 In doing so, state courts frequently rely upon a wide
range of persuasive authority in explaining this departure from Bowers.
99. See 138 CONG. REC. S4784 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992),
100. See Oyamav. California, 332 U.S. 633,650 (1948) (Black & Douglas, J.J., concurring)
("[How could the United States] be faithful to [its] international pledge [under the U.N. Charter]
if state laws which bar ownership and occupancy by aliens on account of race are permitted to be
enforced?"). Cf. Edye v. Robertson, 122 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (the Head Money Cases) (a "non-
self executing treaty... depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the
honor of governments which are parties to it. If these fail, its infraction becomes the subject of
international negotiations and reclamations").
101. Hans A. Linde, Comments, 18 INT'L LAW. 77, 80-81 (1984).
102. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 115 cmt. e (1987) ("[E]ven a non-self-executing treaty of the United States, not effec-
tive as law until implemented by legislative or executive action, may sometimes be held to be a
federal policy and therefore would supersede state law or policy").
103. Such courts include those in Kentucky (Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487,
492 (1992)); New Jersey (State v. Ciuffmi, 395 A.2d 904 (N.J. 1978)); New York (People v.
Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476 (1980)), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); Pennsylvania, (Common-
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As the Kentucky Supreme Court stated in Commonwealth v.
Wasson,10 4 with respect to interpreting the application of Kentucky's
right to privacy to private, consensual homosexual relations, "Con-
trary to popular belief, the Bill of Rights in the United States Consti-
tution represents neither the primary source nor maximum guarantee
of state constitutional liberty."' 5 State and federal courts have used
comparative law from other countries as persuasive authority for
determining the appropriate scope of constitutional protection of indi-
vidual freedom. For example, in Thompson v. Oklahoma,'06 a plurality
of the United States Supreme Court endorsed consideration of "the
views of the international community in determining whether a pun-
ishment is cruel and unusual."' 7 The plurality opinion in that case
stated that:
The conclusion that it would offend civilized standards of
decency to execute a person who was less than 16 years old at the
time of his or her offense is consistent with the views expressed
by... other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage,
and by the leading members of the Western European commu-
nity.10
8
Furthermore, international comparative law provides compelling,
persuasive support for Kansas courts to follow the reasoning of those
state courts that have interpreted their state's constitutional right to
privacy as protecting same-gender private consensual sexual rela-
tions, 1°9 rather than the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court
in Bowers."'
The United States is the only major industrial democracy where
same-sex relations continue to be illegal in a significant part of the
country. No jurisdiction in Europe, with the exception of Moldova,
Romania, and certain countries of the former Soviet Union, prohibit
private consensual homosexual relations."' As discussed previously in
wealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (1980)); Tennessee (Campbell v. Sundquist, 1996 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 46, *32 (Jan. 26, 1996)); and Texas (City of Dallas v. England, 846 S.W.2d 957 (Tx.
App. 1993)). See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
104. Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 492 (1992).
105. Id.
106. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
107. Id. at 830, n.31.
108. Id. at 830-31. See also Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 696 P.2d 527, 531 n.7 (Or.
1985) (wherein the court discussed the right to privacy found in the European Convention on
Human Rights as part of a general discussion of a proposed common law tort of violation of pri-
vacy).
109. See supra note 102.
110. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186.
111. See Wilets, supra note 1, at 34.
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this article, the European Court of Human Rights, with jurisdiction
over all countries in the Council of Europe,112 has ruled on three sepa-
rate occasions that sodomy laws violate the right to privacy under the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights.' The
decisions were based, in part, on the preexisting comparative law of
the European community. As early as 1981, in its opinion in
Dudgeon,"4 the European Court of Human Rights noted:
As compared with the era when [sodomy] legislation was
enacted, there is now a better understanding, and in conse-
quence an increased tolerance, of homosexual behavior to the
extent that in the great majority of the member states of the
Council of Europe it is no longer considered to be necessary or
appropriate to treat homosexual practices of the kind now in
question as in themselves a matter to which the sanctions of the
criminal law should be applied; the court cannot overlook the
changes that have occurred in this regard in the domestic law of
the members states."'
In North America, neither Canada nor Mexico has a sodomy
law, and a recent Canadian court decision interpreted its Charter of
Rights and Freedoms as specifically prohibiting discrimination against
gays and lesbians." 6
Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong have no laws crim-
inalizing consensual same-sex relations."' In Australia, the only state
or province with a sodomy law was Tasmania, and that sodomy law
has been rendered unenforceable as a result of federal legislation
passed in response to the Toonen decision."' Moreover, the Australian
federal government, as well as most Australian states and territories,
have laws that prohibit discrimination against gay people." 9 New
112. For a list of the members of the Council of Europe, see <http://www.coe.int/portal.
asp?L=E&M=$t/001-00-00-2/02/EMB,1,0,0,2,Map.stm>.
113. Dudgeon v. Great Britain, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149 (ser. A) (1981); Norris v. Ireland, 13
Eur H.R. Rep. 186 (ser. A) (1991); Modinos v. Cyprus, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 485 (ser. A) (1993).
114. 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981).
115. Id. at 23-24.
116. See Egan v. Canada [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513.
117. See Wilets, supra note 1, at 34 n.6.
118. In response to the Tasmanian government's refusal to repeal its law, the Australian
Federal Government enacted the Human Rights (sexual conduct) Act of 1994, which invalidates
laws that constitute an "arbitrary interference with privacy." The words of the act track the lan-
guage of the Toonen decision and were intended to implement the Committee's recommendation.
See Douglas Sanders, Getting Lesbian and Gay Issues on the International Human Rights Agenda 31
(May 25, 1995) (Draft manuscript on file with author).
119. See Wilets, supra note 1, at 1027.
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Zealand has no sodomy law and has one of the most far-reaching anti-
discrimination laws in the world.
121
The reliance by the majority in Bowers on comparative law to
support its decision appears highly misplaced, given that the vast
majority of the jurisprudence in the industrialized democracies has
reached a conclusion contrary to Bowers.121 Justice Burger's concur-
ring opinion that "[d]ecisions of individuals relating to homosexual
conduct have been subject to state intervention throughout the history
of Western Civilization, ,122 is rendered particularly nonsensical in
light of Dudgeon and the cases that have been decided subsequently in
Europe, Canada, and Oceania, all countries that share the jurispru-
dential tradition of the United States and that certainly qualify as an
integral part of "Western Civilization." Even Justice Powell conceded
that "the dissent had the better of the arguments.' 121 If even the cru-
cial fifth vote for the majority in Bowers concedes that the majority's
reasoning was weak, the decision in Bowers is rendered all the more
questionable in light of the comparative jurisprudence upon which the
majority at least partially, and incorrectly, relied in its decision.
IV. CONCLUSION
On a substantive level, state courts, as a matter of law, should
find their sodomy statutes unconstitutional under the right to privacy
and equal protection clauses in their state constitutions. State and fed-
eral courts may also, as a matter of law, find the statute unconstitu-
tional under the federal Equal Protection Clause.
On a procedural level, courts should no longer be deferential to
same-sex sodomy statutes. To do so ignores federal equal protection
analysis when animus is shown, and a growing number of state court
have overturned their state's sodomy laws under their own state con-
stitutions using a less deferential approach. General majoritarian con-
cepts of morality, with nothing more, are not sufficient state
justifications for such statutes. Finally, counsel should aggressively
argue against the very validity, or at least applicability, of Bowers as
valid precedent. Doing so greatly undermines states' efforts to draw a
distinction between acts and status. If even Justice Scalia is willing to
120. Id.
121. See Richard B. Lillich, The Constitution and International Human Rights, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 851, 861 (1989) ("If Dudgeon had been relied upon, Justice White might not have char-
acterized Mr. Bowers' claim that his right was 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' as being
'at best facetious.').
122. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
123. Id. at 186.
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recognize that Bowers is no longer valid because of the acts/status dis-
tinction, so should state and federal courts.
Counsel should also remind the court that its decision to over-
turn a state's sodomy statute would conform that state law to federal
policy, international law, the overwhelming jurisprudence of the
democratic world, and the binding rules of judicial construction. On
the other hand, to find the statute constitutional would be inconsistent
with federal public policy, the international commitments and obliga-
tions of the United States government, and the United States Consti-
tution itself.
